
Press Release Minister McEntee

In her recent press release (15 October) the Minister claims landmark reform of An Garda Síochána and Oversight Bodies. Having studied her proposals and compared them with the Report from the Commission on the Future of Policing and considered the trajectory of An Garda Síochána over the past six years - I fundamentally disagree with her claim. She is correct there is massive change involved but this does not represent reform it represents confusion.
My premise is that the Minister's proposal is long delayed and does not match the current situation in Ireland . The main argument I have elaborated on is that the circumstances in the Republic have significantly altered since 2017, and not in a positive way. Drawing from my experience as a policing practitioner, I have come to understand that, in the eyes of the public, the most crucial assessment is the presence of law enforcement personnel. (Boots on the Ground). The Policing Model introduced by Mr. Harris, with the government's approval, has severely undermined this principle through unverified and uncosted structural modifications. This destruction may take years to reverse if ever.
Gardaí provide policing and security services in different environments. These are Urban, Rural, Border, State Security and Organised Crime and International Cooperation. In short, a National Police and Security Service
The challenges faced by law enforcement remain consistent over time: deploying personnel effectively, delivering a responsive and adaptable service to the community, upholding public trust, and ensuring that garda leaders inspire and guide in a forward-thinking way. In everyday language "boots on the ground".
The single biggest operational issue still relates to the Harris policing model which has destroyed the bond which always existed between local communities and their gardai.
"Evidence Based the Situation has deteriorated since 2017".
Developments since 2017
Unprecedented tension arose in the Force under the current commissioner's leadership. Despite his initial warm reception, the majority of rank and file officers later expressed no confidence in Commissioner Drew Harris, with an overwhelming 98.7 percent of the Garda Representative Association voting against him in September 2023. This historic event, with 9,013 out of 9,129 valid votes showing no confidence in Mr. Harris, marked a significant shift in the force's century-long history.
Additionally, the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors marched to Garda HQ in the Phoenix Park in March 2023 to protest against the Commissioner, another unprecedented event in the force's history.
These developments posed major political and reputational challenges for the commissioner.
Garda Superintendent and Chief Superintendents also criticised the Policing Model adopted by the Commissioner, which was not in line with the Commission's recommendations and had roots in a British Model unsuitable for the current environment.
The force's uniform structure faced significant disruption, evident in the struggle to fill the Deputy Commissioner vacancy and ongoing recruitment and retention issues among Gardaí.
The policing service is burdened by excessive bureaucracy
Concerns raised about the handling of Public Order disturbances, putting front line Gardaí at risk.
Despite these issues, many Gardaí showed exemplary dedication, which could serve as a driving force for future success. Significant strides have been made against organised criminal gangs.
The Minister's proposals are criticised for failing to deal with recommendations of the Commission of the Future of Policing.
Key challenges for policing included deploying personnel effectively, providing community-oriented services, maintaining public trust, and fostering leadership that motivates and progresses.
The Minister's Press release simply ignores the Policing Model proposed by the Commission.
The primary concern remained the adequacy of the Policing Model in place.
The Commission's Findings in 2017/2018
The Commission addressed three separate topics.
POLICING MODEL
GOVERNANCE, OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (GOA)
STATE SECURITY
My approach was to assess how the Minister’s Plan aligned with these priority topics.
The narrative commenced in 2017 when the Government appointed a Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland. The nominated Chair was an Irish/American Kathleen O'Toole with a distinguished career in Policing in the United States, one-time Chief Inspector of the Garda Inspectorate, a member of Patten Report team in Northern Ireland and associated with Operation Kenova. She reported in September 2018 and did not remain on in Ireland to oversee its implementation. She asked that the vacant position of Garda Commissioner be held over until her report was considered. The government disregarded that request and went ahead with the appointment of Mr. Harris from the PSNI/RUC.
An Garda Síochána is proud of its tradition as a community police service and, as the 2018 culture audit showed, Gardaí think of themselves as community police. This was also borne out in the Commission’s survey. There are many excellent gardaí who know their communities well and perform an exemplary service, but it is clear that the community policing system as a whole is under strain. Neither the structure of the police organisation nor its practices support the image it has of itself as a community police service. Front line gardaí in many parts of the country complain of a lack of support. Their numbers have been depleted and they are often pulled away from front line policing for other duties, including even serious crime investigations that should be carried out by specialists. Front line police feel undervalued and unrecognised, and those seeking promotion often elect to go into specialist areas and leave community work behind. Communities around the country told this Commission that they attached great importance to community policing. But many complained of a lack of community police visibility and continuity, and many people told us in submissions or public meetings that they no longer knew who their local community police were.
The Commission made 50 Recommendations and the entire Report is available here on button press.
In line with my "Boots on the Ground" approach I have selected key recommendations and I compared the actual situation now with the recommendations made .
The often used "mantra" by Minister and Commissioner is that they are following the recommendations of the Commission particularly in relation to the Policing Model. This is not factually accurate and the destructive scheme introduced is not in line with the Commission’s recommendations.
SIMPLIFIED GARDA UNIFORM SERVICE STRUCTURE

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 21
The structure of the police service should be designed with the new district policing model at its core. Divisional level assets, administration offices and specialist units, should be seen as supporting the work of the front line: (Ch. 5 para. 5, Ch. 17 paras. 2 and 4)
All police service personnel at district level, sworn and non-sworn, should be considered to be community police. (Ch. 5 para. 2)
District police should be competent, empowered, and resourced, to handle most day to day policing demands themselves and to provide a full community service. (Ch. 5 paras. 3 and 5)
District commanders should have a high degree of delegated authority to take decisions, and be held accountable by their superiors for their performance against the objectives in their policing plans. (Ch. 5 para. 6, Ch. 17 para. 4)
· CURRENT STATUS: COMMISSIONER HARRIS AND THE MINISTER HAVE DRIVEN A COACH AND FOUR THROUGH THIS RECOMMENDATION. DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENTS (THE DISTRICT COMMANDERS) HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THEIR POSITION OF SINGULAR AUTHORITY IN THEIR DISTRICTS. THEY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED TO NEW ROLES OPERATING A DIVISIONAL BASIS. THIS HAS REMOVED FROM THE MOST VITAL COG RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMISSION I.E THE DISTRICT OPERATING UNIT WHICH IS CLOSER TO THE COMMUNITY AND REALISTICALLY IS MORE EFFICIENT IN DELIVERING THE VERY NECESSARY COMMUNITY SERVICE. THE ESSENCE OF WHICH IS THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNITY KNOW THEIR GARDAÍ AND THEY KNOW THEIR POLICE.
A DIVISIONAL MODEL HAS BEEN INTRODUCED WHICH LACKS DEMOGRAPHICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL LOGIC.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION 24
We propose the deletion of the six regional offices from the organisational structure, to be replaced by a small number of Assistant Commissioners at headquarters dividing the divisions between them. These Assistant Commissioners should direct resource allocation between divisions, hold the divisions to account for their performance, have command responsibility for major operations and ensure inter-divisional cooperation when necessary. (Ch. 17 para. 13)
· CURRENT STATUS. THIS RECOMMENDATION HAS BEEN IGNORED, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONERS HAVE BEEN REDEPLOYED TO FOUR REGIONS THE NUMBER OF ASSISTANT COMMISSIONERS HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED THESE SUPER REGIONS ARE UNMANAGEABLE AND GEOGRAPHICALLY INCOHERENT. PLEASE SEE THE MAP BELOW AND AS AN EXAMPLE , CONSIDER THE NORTHWEST REGION WHICH COVERS A GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD FROM GALWAY TO MALIN HEAD AND FROM GALWAY TO THE COOLEY PENINSULA. AN ADDITIONAL FEATURE AS SHOWN IN THE MAP IS THAT STATE-OF-THE-ART COMMUNICATIONS CENTRES HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED TO THE FOUR REGIONS. THE PROBLEM IS THEIR OPERATION, A CALLER MAKING AN EMERGENCY CALL WILL BE ROUTED TO THE CONTROL CENTRE ALLOCATED TO THE PARTICULAR REGION. LOCAL STATIONS ARE PREVENTED FROM DISPATCHING LOCALLY CONTROLLED ASSETS WITHOUT FIRST REROUTING THE CALLS MANY MILES AWAY. A CALLER IN MALIN WILL BE REROUTED TO GALWAY AND THE CALL TAKER WILL ASK A CONTROLLER IN THAT CENTRE TO ALLOCATE A RESPONSE FROM THE ORIGINATING CALLER'S LOCATION THEREBY BYPASSING LOCAL TIMELY RESPONSES AND SIGNIFICANTLY WASTING VALUABLE TIME IN THE PROCESS.

Ministers Announcement
The Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024 was signed into law by the President on 7 February 2024. Since then, an extensive programme of work has been undertaken to enable its commencement in conjunction with the Department’s Programme Partners in An Garda Síochána, GSOC, the Policing Authority and the Garda Síochána Inspectorate.
The Act will come into effect on 16 December.
This announcement by the Minister on the eve of a general election is most interesting. A so called reform process has been in train since 2017. The announcement by the Minister Helen McEntee was greeted by a muted whisper in the Media. This is disappointing on one level and totally predictable on the other.
The Minister failed to recount the context for this Act and the political action which took place in 2018 and subsequent key events. In essence what problem was being addressed?
She failed to mention the important topic the POLICING MODEL which was introduced by Commissioner Harris . Perhaps she chose not to defend the indefensible. The Minister for Justice Charles Flanagan became an ardent defender of the new commissioner in the most trenchant and irrelevant terms. He was replaced by Helen McEntee in 2022 and this same symbiotic relationship continued.
KEY EVENTS
· The appointment of a Commission on the Future of Policing in 2017, which Reported in September 2018.
The appointment of Deputy Chief Constable Drew Harris PSNI as Garda Commissioner also in September 2018.
The publication of the report from the Commission and the Implementation Plan of government in January 2019.
The drafting of enabling legislation which would give effect to the structural provision of government for the intended changes. This became the Policing, Security and Community Safety Act 2024.
The other task undertaken was the appointment of the relevant boards and this took place during 2024. These arrangements were the subject of the Ministers Announcement on the 15 October and she also outlined that the Boards would be formally appointed on the 16 December.
One must consider very seriously if the time lapse which has occurred between 2017 and 2024 affects the validity of the changes intended. Self evidently the overall circumstances obtaining now are radically different from the original 2017 position.
One thing is clear that the government had decided that the position of garda commissioner would not be filled by a serving garda as evidence by their composition of the commissioners interview board in 2018. Government ministers clearly made their views known that something need to be done about the Garda Síochána, forgetting that all appointments at chief officer level had been made by them in the past.
The 2018 Interview Board was a most interesting composition which underlines the anyone but garda approach. The government approach is very clear. Not a single representative with domestic policing experience.
I can absolutely guarantee that no Chief Officer in the British Police would be appointed in this fashion.
Chairperson:
Ms. Jane Williams Chairwoman, TLAC Managing Partner, Sia Partners
Board Members:
Mr. Joe Brosnan Former Secretary General, Department of Justice
Mr. Bob Collins Member of the Policing Authority
Ms. Josephine Feehily Chairperson of the Policing Authority
Mr. Martin Fraser Secretary General to the Government
Ms. Anne Heraty Chief Executive Officer, Cpl Resources plc
Mr. Iain Livingstone Interim Chief Constable Police Scotland
Mr. Alex Marshall General Manager, Anti-Corruption Unit, International Cricket Council Former Chief Executive, College of Policing UK Former Chief Constable, Hampshire Constabulary
Public jobs representatives:
Ms. Lisa Keyes (shortlisting and preliminary interview)
Ms. Margaret McCabe (final interview)
Absence of Political Debate
There has been an absence of debate on this topic. One genuine expert who deserves respect is Denis Bradley who is former Vice-Chair of the Policing Board in Northern Ireland. He has walked the walk and he is entitled to be listened to and he produced a Model for Oversight, Governance and Accountability which has a lot of merit. He delivered this extempore to the MacGill Summer School in 2017. He had one thought and that is that elected politicians (and others) should be directly involved in the oversight and accountability of the garda service. This implies a direct executive role probably like the Policing board in Northern Ireland. In a sterile landscape his views deserve consideration and he is also of the view that sustained criticism of the policing system can be counterproductive. I agree with that latter statement.
Compare and Contrast the experience of Policing Change in Northern Ireland
In a significant policing transformation, the RUC was replaced by the PSNI , thanks to the efforts of the Patten Commission. An Independent Oversight Commissioner and Oversight Body were appointed to supervise the Patten Report's implementation. Tom Constantine, a respected Law Enforcement professional from the United States, accepted the role under the condition of complete independence. Notably, his initial test was defending and securing his independence, which he successfully achieved.
Another interesting caveat is that the Chair of the Implementation Group was not required to have police experience. This was in sharp contrast to the Northern Ireland experience where all members of the Oversight Body had Law Enforcement experience.
The Northern Ireland Policing Board Model
The Policing Board is an independent public body made up of 10 Political and 9 Independent Members established to ensure for all the people of Northern Ireland an effective, efficient, impartial, representative and accountable police service which will secure the confidence of the whole community, by reducing crime and the fear of crime. Members of the Board are bound by a Code of Conduct and operate under agreed Standing Orders.
The Board has a range of legislative duties to meet. Through meetings of the Policing Board and the work of its committees, it holds the Chief Constable to account for the delivery of the policing service.
Minister’s Problems
These are the problems and opportunities which face the Minister today. Governance and accountability are of course important considerations and there are some aspects of the Ministers strategy that merit some recognition.
Commission on the Future of Policing 2017 - 2018.
The Commission was destined to fail because it was watered down and obviously ignored in terms of the Policing Model.
The Act indicates that the Minister and Government hold executive authority over the Force, especially over the Commissioner. The only exception is that the Commissioner cannot be instructed to investigate or not investigate a specific individual.
The Minister consistently claims that her sole duty is to provide resources to the Force, overlooking the wide-ranging powers she possesses. This is not legally or factually accurate.
This overall approach in Dublin could not have been more diametrically opposed the change adopted in Northern Ireland.
Commission's Recommendations on Governance and Accountability
The Commission: The current architecture for policing in Ireland is confused. There is a lack of clarity, and some overlap between the respective roles of the various oversight bodies – Department of Justice and Equality, Policing Authority, Garda Síochána Inspectorate and the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission.
There is also a lack of distinction between the roles of some of these external bodies and the responsibility of the police service for its own governance. The lack of coherence in the oversight framework has been to the detriment of clear and effective accountability for policing in Ireland. In the next few chapters of this report we propose anew, coherent framework, and for this purpose we distinguish between accountability, oversight and governance in the following way.
First, we consider accountability in the sense of the democratic accountability of the police to the people through their elected representatives.
The Commissioner is accountable to the Minister for Justice and Equality, who in turn is accountable to the Oireachtas.
Accountability in its broadest sense should run through the police service at all levels – everyone accountable to their supervisors for their performance. It should apply also to the oversight bodies. All are accountable to the community for delivering effective policing and community safety.
Second, oversight is the responsibility of appointed bodies, each with their defined duties to monitor, inspect and investigate the performance of the police.
Separately, internal governance, and day to day management of the police service should be the responsibility of the police themselves led by the Garda Commissioner. Without responsibility there can be no accountability, and that is the present situation.
Commission's Infographic

The appropriate structures for governance, oversight and accountability, to ensure:
that policing operates within a clear framework of governance and accountability to the law and the community, that is supported by coherent structures,
that policing is constrained by, accountable to and acts only within the law,
that policing powers and procedures, like the law, are clearly established and publicly available,
that breaches of discipline are effectively and fairly addressed,
that there are open, accessible and independent means of investigating and adjudicating fairly upon complaints against the police,
The Dublin Implementation Strategy
It is worth noting that the Chair in this case was not required to possess a background in law enforcement, which differs significantly from Northern Ireland, where every member of the Oversight Body had experience in law enforcement.
The Plan was supposed to be rolled out in 4 stages during the implementation period - Building Blocks; Launching; Scaling; and Consolidation. Building Blocks included a wide range of Implementers, leading to a confusing mix of activities.
Frankly this approach was meaningless in the real world of running a Policing and Security service, totally lacking in coherence or direction.
Ultimately it was to bring forth the "Landmark Reform" that the Minister announce a few days ago.
The Implementation Matrix used in the Republic was tightly controlled politically, with a strong grip. It was not an independent exercise quite different from Northern Ireland
It is important to acknowledge the significant challenge faced by legal drafters as they strove to merge numerous conflicting principles and concepts concerning this "reform" into a single comprehensive set of laws. This work was undertaken under political direction.
These are the new bodies announced by the Minister and provided for in the Act
Policing and Community Safety Authority
This body will report to the Minister and it is an amalgamation of the Policing Authority and the Garda Inspectorate.
Bord an Gharda Síochána
This is a new non-executive Board with power in relation to operational matters. It will report to the minister.
Fiosrsú – Office of the Police Ombudsman
This is reworking of GSOC and now will have one Commissioner who is appointed by the President on the recommendation of Government. Its funding will come through the Minister who retains certain functions. The Ombudsman will provide reports to the Minister on a wide tranche of activities.
National Office for Community Safety
This a new organisation with a nebulous remit and it reports to a Steering Group which in turn reports to a Cabinet Committee.
Remuneration - Fees paid to Board and Authority members
The Chair of the Board and the Authority will be paid a fee of €29,888 per annum.
Ordinary members of the Board and Authority will be paid a fee of €14,963 per annum.
It should be noted that in line with the ‘One Person One Salary’ principle, no public servant will be entitled to receive remuneration in the form of board fees, save for situations that are statutorily provided for e.g. Worker Directors.
Travel and Subsistence is paid at Civil Service Rates.
Many people demonstrate a high level of altruism by offering their services to serve on boards and contribute to the success of the Garda Síochána. While it is generally a part-time commitment, it is still valuable.
The bodies outlined by the Minister that relate to Governance and Accountability are bureaucratic in nature and political control is strongly asserted throughout these exchanges.
The Police Ombudsman is appointed by the President in the nomination by Government.
AUTHORS INFOGRAPHIC

Conclusion - Policing
There is marked difference between the recommendations of the Commission and "No response from the Minister". It seems that the Minister has abdicated the responsibility of defining the Policing response to Commissioner Harris.
I have demonstrated that his approach has ignored the recommendations of the Commission. There is no other conclusion to be drawn other than that this is a radical failure and a disappointment which will have long range negative consequences.
Governance, Accountability and Oversight (Minister)
Secondly the proposals for Governance, Accountability and Oversight are confusing.
Several bodies are recommended,
The Policing Community and Safety Authority and the Garda Board. The Commission placed a strong emphasis on the difference between accountability and governance. They considered that there should be strong governance structures within the Force and that accountability could be managed by external oversight.
The Commission: The current architecture for policing in Ireland is confused. There is a lack of clarity, and some overlap between the respective roles of the various oversight bodies – Department of Justice and Equality, Policing Authority, Garda Síochána Inspectorate and the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission.
There is also a lack of distinction between the roles of some of these external bodies and the responsibility of the police service for its own governance. The lack of coherence in the oversight framework has been to the detriment of clear and effective accountability for policing in Ireland.
In the next few chapters of this report we propose anew, coherent framework, and for this purpose we distinguish between accountability, oversight and governance in the following way.
First, we consider accountability in the sense of the democratic accountability of the police to the people through their elected representatives. The Commissioner is accountable to the Minister for Justice and Equality, who in turn is accountable to the Oireachtas. Accountability in its broadest sense should run through the police service at all levels – everyone accountable to their supervisors for their performance.
It should apply also to the oversight bodies. All are accountable to the community for delivering effective policing and community safety. Second, oversight is the responsibility of appointed bodies, each with their defined duties to monitor, inspect and investigate the performance of the police.
Separately, internal governance, and day to day management of the police service should be the responsibility of the police themselves led by the Garda Commissioner. Without responsibility there can be no accountability, and that is the present state of affairs.
The confusion referred to by the Commission has not been resolved. There was and there is a need for clarity and relative simplicity and the opportunity has been missed, unfortunately.
Another body has been created The National Office of Community Safety which reports to a Steering Group, that in turn reports to a Cabinet Committee.
Minister Comments
National Office for Community Safety
The National Office will lead the rollout of the Government’s new strategy for improving community safety. Working closely with Local Community Safety Partnerships (LCSPs), the Office will be responsible for providing support, training, and guidance to local authorities to enhance community safety across Ireland. This initiative is a key component of the Government’s broader efforts to promote inter-agency collaboration and inclusive community engagement at the local level.
This is a venture which exists on paper and one has little confidence that it will play the role described by the Minister. There are just too many variables involved to achieve a coherent product. This is not disrespectful to those nominated to populate this exercise it is merely a fact.
AUTHORS INFOGRAPHIC

This diagram represents an honest evaluation of the minister's approach in terms of structures and new bodies. I would be very happy to be proved wrong. I must admit that my orientation is to the Policing Service and its ability to deliver for the community. I used the rhetorical phrase "Who takes care of the day Job" while all this bureaucracy is swimming through the airwaves. The simple answer is the responsibility rests with the Garda Commissioner.
One sees briefly that the role of the Commissioner is central to the interaction between the various bodies with the Minister and the Oireachtas. The Commissioner is on a separate line of direct report to the Minister and is subject to specific direction from the Minister. In simple terms, How could any Commissioner cope with these demands and at the same time provide a realistic Policing and Security service? The answer is as obvious as the question, there is no way that interaction can be managed without a negative impact on the "day job". The basic police service is in considerable difficult for many reasons but particularly for the way in which the traditional model of policing was disassembled in favour of a Policing Model which had no intellectual or practical basis and contrary to the Recommendation of the Commission.
Minister - Independent Examiner of Security Legislation
Part 7 of the 2024 Act provides for the establishment of the Independent Examiner of Security Legislation.
The Independent Examiner is an entirely new role and represents a significant development in enhancing Ireland’s national security infrastructure. It provides for the independent review of security legislation and security arrangements. The Independent Examiner will:
Keep under review the operation and effectiveness of security legislation to ensure that it remains necessary and fit for purpose and contains sufficient safeguards for protecting human rights.
Have a general examination function in relation to the delivery of security services. State offices and agencies who have a security remit will be obliged to cooperate with the Independent Examiner.
Review cases where information providers may refuse to provide information to the Police Ombudsman and the Policing and Community Safety Authority (PCSA) on the grounds of security of the State.
The Independent Examiner will assume the existing oversight roles, currently carried out by designated High Court judges, relating to the operation of statutory frameworks for data retention, interception of communications and surveillance following a three-month period of transition.
Reporting to the Taoiseach, the Independent Examiner will be supported by an office and will also be empowered to produce other subject matter reports as necessary.
Given its extensive scope, this recommendation is remarkably intricate, and there is considerable uncertainty regarding whether all the significant implications it presents have been thoroughly assessed. It represents a pioneering approach, necessitating a high level of caution. For instance, a clear illustration of this is seen in the authority granted to the Independent Examiner to engage consultants for support.
Any of the Information Holders either domestic or foreign would be gravely concerned if such entities were not vetted on a continuous basis and indeed may flat refuse to share information with unvetted third parties.
This is just one simple example and there are many more.
The Independent Examiner of Security Legislation is appointed by Government. This provision is deserving of special analysis. It is directly copied from the British System as outlined by the Commission.
Commission: We recommend the establishment of an Independent Examiner of terrorist and serious crime legislation, based on the model used in the United Kingdom. The Examiner would maintain a continuous review of how security legislation is being implemented by police and other agencies, and evaluate the case for changes needed to match the evolving threats while respecting fundamental rights. This would require the Examiner to have powers to review the conduct of particular security operations when concerns arise that call for independent scrutiny. Access to papers and personnel would be needed to discharge theses duties, with redactions only for the identity of informants.
This is new legal provision which has wide ranging implications for the way in which the State Security is protected. It is impossible at this stage to form a view on its potential to fulfil that task having regard to sensitivity and complexity of the State Security agencies, Garda and Military.
The appointment is made by the Government. It would have been prudent to enact this legislation as a separate stand-alone legal provision. State Security has little relationship with the provision relating to the Policing responsibility.
A key provision relates to the definition of Information Holder and the powers of the Independent Examiner to access information from those services. This is an unprecedented development and cannot have been welcomed by the current security practitioners.
Information Holders
An Garda Síochána
Permanent Defence Forces
Any Minister of the government or any other public body....
With responsibilities relating to national security and protecting the security of the State, including the safeguarding of critical infrastructure, the economic well-being of the State and international relations.
Responsible for, or involved in, the development, implementation or operation of security legislation, or
In possession of information, documents or any other thing which, in the opinion of the Independent Examiner, is relevant to his or her work
Powers relating to Information Holder
242. (1) For the purposes of the performance of his or her functions, the Independent Examiner may, by notice in writing— |
(a) require an information holder who, in the opinion of the Independent Examiner, possesses information or has a document or thing in his or her power or control which is relevant for the performance of the Independent Examiner’s functions, to provide that information, document or thing to the Independent Examiner, and |
(b) where appropriate, require an information holder or a person nominated on behalf of an information holder to attend before the Independent Examiner for the purpose of a requirement under paragraph (a). |
(2) An information holder the subject of a requirement specified in a notice under subsection (1), or a person nominated by such an information holder, shall comply with the requirement. |
(3) The Independent Examiner and an information holder may agree a memorandum of understanding concerning the manner in which information, documents or things are provided to the Independent Examiner under this section. |
(4) An information holder, or a person nominated by the information holder, required to attend before the Independent Examiner pursuant to a notice under subsection (1)(b)— |
(a) shall, subject to subsection (5), answer fully and truthfully any question put to him or her by the Independent Examiner, and |
(b) if so requested by the Independent Examiner, shall sign a declaration of the truth of his or her answer to the question. |
(5) Where— |
(a) any information, document or thing is provided to the Independent Examiner in accordance with a notice under subsection (1)(a), or |
(b) the Independent Examiner puts a question to a person under subsection |
the information holder or person nominated by the information holder, as the case may be, who provides the information, document or thing or to whom the question is put shall ensure that the information, document or thing provided, or the answer given, as the case may be, is subject to such exclusions or redactions as he or she considers necessary to— |
(i) safeguard international intelligence sources, or |
(ii) conceal the identity of a person, where to reveal the identity of the person might endanger the life or safety of any person. |
(6) The Independent Examiner may request that appropriate facilities and accommodation be made available within the premises of an information holder to permit the examination of information, documents or things and to put questions to individuals and where he or she so requests an information holder shall comply with the request. |
(7) The Minister may, having regard to subsection (6), prescribe the manner in which information, documents or things are to be provided by information holders to the Independent Examiner. |
Power to Engage Consultants
(a) engage such consultants or advisers as he or she considers necessary to assist in the performance of his or her functions under this Act, and |
(b) enter into a contract with any person or body concerning any matter arising in relation to those functions. |
(2) The Minister may, with the consent of the Taoiseach and having regard to the need to protect the security of the State, make regulations providing for procedures to determine the suitability of, and any requirements to be met by— |
(a) consultants or advisers referred to in subsection (1)(a), or |
(b) persons or bodies referred to in subsection (1)(b). |
(3) The Minister may, having consulted with the Taoiseach, refuse to provide his or her consent under subsection (1) where the Minister is of the opinion that the consultant or adviser who the Independent Examiner proposes to engage under paragraph (a) of that subsection, or the person or body with whom the Independent Examiner proposes to enter into a contract under paragraph (b) thereof— |
(a) does not meet such requirements (if any) as may be specified in regulations under subsection (2), or |
(b) is otherwise not suitable.
|
Cautionary Approach
This new Independent Examiner will be the subject of keen interest from foreign Intelligence agencies. In direct terms this new office will be the subject of intrusion electronically and personally by these foreign interests.
Our current agencies will have concern regarding the dissemination of information to the Office Holder and to other organs of government. These are serious concerns and will be of interest to foreign agencies who share information with the Garda and the Defence Forces, who certainly will not want their intelligence information compromised.
Is the effort justified by the outcome?
Question: What is the significance of all these different measures? What kind of changes can the community expect in the Garda service? Will there be an increase in the number of Gardaí patrolling your street, road, or townland? In case of emergency, will Gardaí respond more promptly to your aid, ensuring your safety at night?
Answer: Actually, no. These measures primarily focus on Governance, Oversight, and Accountability (GOA). They do not address the core function of the Garda Síochána, which is to provide a consistent policing service to the community.
Some may feel reassured that the Garda Síochána is closely monitored, but in reality, this system resembles a performance of Hamlet without the presence of the Prince.
About the Author
John O’Brien, a retired Detective Chief Superintendent, he previously led the International Liaison Protection section at Garda HQ and served as the National Head of Interpol and Europol.
He strongly advocates for international cooperation in policing and security and fully supports the ongoing efforts to repatriate criminal gangs to Ireland. He is critical of the recent trend of appointing non-domestic officers to top positions within An Garda Síochána, considering Ireland to be an exception in this practice.
Throughout his career, he held roles as Divisional Chief Superintendent in Louth/Meath and Laois/Offaly Divisions, as well as positions as superintendent, detective inspector, uniform inspector, and sergeant. He enjoyed his frontline garda duties immensely.
He holds an MSc in Public Order Studies from Leicester University.
Author of four books, including A Question of Honour, Politics and Policing (2020), Securing the Irish State (2022), The Troubles Come South (2023), and The Great Deception (2024).
With a career spanning back to the 1970s, he has maintained a professional and personal interest in the Dublin and Monaghan Car Bombings of 17 May 1974. His namesake (no relation), John O’Brien, along with his wife Anna and their two children, Jacqueline and Anne Marie, tragically lost their lives in the Parnell Street explosion. On that day, thirty-four innocent lives were taken.
He highlights the lack of justice pursued by the Irish and British states for the victims of these bombings. Now, fifty years later, there is a call to revisit and refocus the review and investigation efforts in Dublin, where the responsibility lies and with the Garda Commissioner who knows more about legacy than anyone else on the island of Ireland.
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