False Flag - Operation Denton
- JOHN OBRIEN
- Oct 27
- 9 min read
Updated: Oct 28
Sir Iain Livingstone Head of Operation Denton
Operation Denton Review – False Dawn
The Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 17 May 1974 stand as the deadliest atrocity of the Troubles, claiming 34 lives in the Republic of Ireland. Despite the passage of time, accountability for these events remains elusive, shaped by jurisdictional complexities, secrecy doctrines, and strategies of narrative deflection.
Scene in Talbot Street 17 May 1974 - 15 Murdered
NCND
“Neither Confirm nor Deny” (NCND) is a British policy used by government and security agencies when asked questions about sensitive matters such as:
intelligence operations,
covert sources (agents, informants, surveillance),
classified information, or
the existence or non-existence of certain records.
Instead of answering “yes” or “no”, an agency or witness responds by refusing to confirm or deny the proposition hence - NCND.
It was used in Operation Kenova / Stakeknife criminal investigation to hide the identity of Stakeknife - Freddie Scapatticci, the British Agent and IRA killer.
It is highly probable that it will be used in the Operation Denton Report which includes the Bombings in its remit. Denton is the code name for this Operation and is being run by British Police who have no jursidiction in the republic
Incredibly Dublin has allowed the British to include the bombings in Operation Denton failing to take action themselves. This is regardless of the experience of Operation Kenova/Stakeknife investigation where Jon Boutcher was not permitted to name Freddie Scapatticci as Stakeknife despite the British minding him and rewarding him for over a decade. This was the outworking of the policy of NCND and there is every possibility that Denton will follow the same course.
This concession has created an imbalance, with British authorities controlling the narrative and disclosure. Combined with NCND restrictions and deflection strategies, this risks reshaping the historical understanding of the bombings, portraying Dublin as administratively deficient rather than a victim of possible state-sponsored violence. In other words Dublin has no right to full access under the British system of NCND.
Ultimately, the intersection of NCND secrecy and an ongoing deflection strategy forms a robust shield for the British state against full accountability. Without confronting these doctrines, Operation Denton may follow the path of Operation Kenova, delivering a procedurally sound inquiry whose findings are politically constrained.
For Ireland, the challenge remains to assert its sovereignty and ensure that truth recovery for crimes committed on its soil is not compromised. This has not happened.
In 2019, the Barnard judgment revealed that the PSNI had breached the expectations of victims' families by halting the Historical Enquiries Team’s Glenanne Thematic Review. This led to the establishment of Operation Denton, a UK-led review that includes the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.
The Irish Government have accepted this arrangement, despite berating the British for years for not releasing information. However, this decision should raise concerns about sovereignty, as a British process now governs disclosure on an atrocity that occurred in the republic.
The British Government’s ‘Neither Confirm nor Deny’ (NCND) policy, originally designed to protect covert sources, has evolved into a significant obstacle to transparency. In Operation Kenova, which investigated the Stakeknife case, NCND was used to prevent the identification of handlers and agents. This same policy threatens to limit Operation Denton’s ability to reveal the extent of British involvement in loyalist violence, further complicating efforts to uncover the truth.
Deflection Strategy
Adding to these challenges is a persistent deflection strategy employed by certain British and Northern figures including the media. This strategy reframes responsibility for the bombings through four key narratives: blaming Dublin’s policies for provoking the attacks, downplaying the significance of the bombings compared to IRA attacks in Britain, portraying southern authorities as either incompetent or complicit, and mutualising blame to suggest equal failure on all sides.
These tactics serve to dilute British culpability and shift focus away from potential state-enabled violence.
For Ireland, the decision to allow Operation Denton to investigate the bombings unquestioningly creates an unacceptable risk—sacrificing jurisdictional control for alleged access to critical intelligence. However, this concession has created an imbalance, with British authorities controlling the narrative and disclosure. Combined with NCND restrictions and deflection strategies, this risks reshaping the historical understanding of the bombings, portraying Dublin as administratively deficient rather than a victim of possible state-sponsored violence.
Ultimately, the intersection of NCND secrecy and narrative deflection forms a robust shield for the British state against full accountability. Without confronting these doctrines, Operation Denton may follow the path of Operation Kenova, delivering a procedurally sound inquiry whose findings are politically constrained. For Ireland, the challenge remains to assert its sovereignty and ensure that truth recovery for crimes committed on its soil is not compromised.
ACC Drew Harris’s Role in the Historical Enquiries Team and the Glenanne Thematic Review.
The ubiquitous Drew Harris served as Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) for Crime Operations in the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) from 2006 to 2014. During this period, he was responsible for overseeing key divisions such as the Serious Crime Branch, providing liaison with the Legacy and Historical Enquiries Team (HET), and coordinating intelligence with MI5 and other agencies.
Although the HET operated with a “stand-alone” operational model, it was legally part of the PSNI’s corporate structure and subject to oversight by senior officers including Harris.
The Historical Enquiries Team (HET) and the Glenanne Thematic Review
The HET was established in 2005 with the purpose of reviewing all unresolved deaths related to the Troubles. Between 2010 and 2013, the HET undertook the “Glenanne Thematic Review,” which investigated approximately 120 cases connected to a suspected network involving Mid-Ulster UVF, UDR, and RUC personnel, collectively referred to as the Glenanne Gang. Families of victims, with support from the Pat Finucane Centre (PFC), were regularly consulted during the review process, and HET officers assured them that a comprehensive thematic report would be published. At this time, ACC Drew Harris was the senior officer responsible for legacy oversight, holding corporate responsibility for the HET’s policies, outputs, and alignment with PSNI priorities. He did not manage the team daily but he was accountable for its direction.
HMIC Criticism and the Disbanding of HET (2013–2014)
In July 2013, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) issued a critical report stating that the HET lacked independence when investigating killings involving state actors such as the RUC, UDR, and British Army. The report concluded that the HET applied less rigorous standards to these cases and failed to comply with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In response, the PSNI suspended HET operations, a decision made under Chief Constable Matt Baggott and implemented by ACC Drew Harris. This suspension included halting the nearly complete Glenanne Thematic Review and reassigning HET staff to other units within the Serious Crime Branch.
Families’ Reaction and Legal Challenge
The families of Glenanne victims, including Edward Barnard—whose brother Patrick Barnard was killed at the Hillcrest Bar in Dungannon in 1976—protested the cancellation of the thematic report. They claimed that PSNI senior management, led operationally by ACC Drew Harris, had unilaterally cancelled a publicly promised review. Correspondence from 2014 to 2015 revealed the PSNI’s position, as articulated by senior officers within Harris’s portfolio: “Thematic reports are no longer being completed; legacy cases will proceed on a case-by-case basis.” This shift in policy formed the basis for the Barnard judicial review.
The Court’s Finding: Barnard v Chief Constable of PSNI (2019)
The Court of Appeal determined that the PSNI, through its senior command, had made clear and unequivocal promises to produce a thematic report. By discontinuing the Glenanne Thematic Review, the PSNI had breached the legitimate expectations of affected families. Although the Chief Constable was named as the respondent in the legal proceedings, the policies in question originated within the ACC (Crime Operations) directorate, led by Drew Harris. As such, Harris’s role was pivotal; he oversaw the area responsible for ending the review—a decision later judged to be procedurally unfair and contrary to those legitimate expectations.
Aftermath and Legacy
By the time the Barnard judgement was delivered in 2019, Drew Harris had become Garda Commissioner , having been appointed in 2018. Nevertheless, the judgment addressed actions and decisions made during his tenure with the PSNI between 2013 and 2014. The PSNI Chief Constable at the time of the judgment, George Hamilton, accepted the court’s findings and commissioned an independent review, which led to the launch of Operation Denton under Jon Boutcher’s leadership.
Summary of Drew Harris’s Role in the Chain of Events
Analytical Note
Although Drew Harris did not appear in court and was not individually named in the proceedings, he was the senior officer accountable for legacy operations at the time of the decision under review. The Barnard judgment effectively reversed the policy established during his oversight, compelling the PSNI to fulfill the original promise made by the HET. In this context, Harris’s legacy role was institutionall, but it was central to the sequence of events that led to the Barnard case and, subsequently, Operation Denton.
Mr. Harris as Commissioner of An Garda Síochána 2018 – 2025
Mr. Harris was appointed commissioner in September 2019, and he was to serve for 7 years in that role. On an interesting note the current Head of Operation Denton is Sir Iain Livingstone who together with another British Police officer sat on the Board that recommended Mr. Harris for appointment.
There is no information available in the public arena that he initiated action to review or investigate the single biggest atrocity committed during the Troubles in the republic. He was content to stand aside and let his former colleagues carry out a review outside the Irish jurisdiction even though at the same time he had an investigation carried in this jurisdiction into the Belturbet bombing of 1972. This is position is impossible to reconcile one with the other.
As has been stated many times the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 17 May 1974 stand as the deadliest atrocities of the Troubles, claiming 34 lives in the Republic of Ireland. Despite the passage of time, accountability for these events remains elusive, shaped by jurisdictional complexities, secrecy doctrines, and strategies of narrative deflection.
In 2019, the Barnard judgment revealed that the PSNI had breached the expectations of victims' families by halting the Historical Enquiries Team’s Glenanne Thematic Review. This led to the establishment of Operation Denton, a UK-led review that includes the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. This decision has raised concerns about sovereignty, as a British process now governs disclosure on an atrocity that occurred in the Republic.
The British Government’s ‘Neither Confirm nor Deny’ (NCND) policy, originally designed to protect covert sources, has evolved into a significant obstacle to transparency. In Operation Kenova, which investigated the Stakeknife case, NCND was used to prevent the identification of handlers and agents. This same policy threatens to limit Operation Denton’s ability to reveal the extent of British involvement in loyalist violence, further complicating efforts to uncover the truth.
Adding to these challenges is a persistent deflection strategy employed by certain British and Northern figures. This strategy reframes responsibility for the bombings through four key narratives: blaming Dublin’s policies for provoking the attacks, downplaying the significance of the bombings compared to IRA attacks in Britain, portraying southern authorities as either incompetent or complicit, and mutualising blame to suggest equal failure on all sides. These tactics serve to dilute British culpability and shift focus away from potential state-enabled violence.
Mr. Harris was well aware of the NCND policy and he employed it in Dublin at the Smithwick Tribunal
Smithwick was a public Tribunal of Inquiry in Dublin into alleged Garda collusion in the 1989 murders of Chief Supt. Harry Breen and Supt. Bob Buchanan. Harris attended as Assistant Chief Constable (PSNI).
A key witness was then ACC Drew Harris PSNI and subsequently Commissioner An Garda Síochána, He repeatedly invoked NCND during his testimony
How he used NCND :
Harris personally and repeatedly invoked NCND in sworn evidence. He used phrases like “I can neither confirm nor deny that we are in possession of that identity,” whenever he was asked:
to identify alleged Garda informants,
to identify specific IRA members said to have ordered or carried out murders (e.g. Tom Oliver),
to confirm whether certain people were PSNI/MI5 sources,
to say whether a named (or unnamed) Garda in Dundalk fed information to the IRA.
Across the transcript he does this again and again — at least 11 distinct invocations. He would not confirm names, dates, source access, or even whether particular pieces of intelligence existed beyond the redacted summaries.
The Omagh Paradox
Would London accept Dublin running the Omagh investigation and pronouncing on events in Northern Ireland? In blunt terms, no — the British state would not concede that kind of external lead over an atrocity in its jurisdiction. And politically, London would treat that as an encroachment on sovereignty and they would be right.
So the open question is why does Dublin adopt this deferential stance of compliance irrespective of the jurisdictional boundaries and their sovereign responsibility.
Comments